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Abstract We consider group identification models in which the aggregation of indi-
vidual opinions concerning who is qualified in a given society determines the set of
socially qualified persons. In this setting, we study the extent to which social quali-
fication can be changed when societies expand, shrink, or partition themselves. The
answers we provide are with respect to the computational complexity of the cor-
responding control problems and fully cover the class of consent aggregation rules
introduced by Samet & Schmeidler (2003) as well as procedural rules for group
identification. We obtain both polynomial-time solvability results and NP-hardness
results. In addition, we also study these problems from the parameterized complexity
perspective, and obtain some fixed-parameter tractability results.
Keywords Consent rules · Procedural rules · Computational complexity · Group
control · Parameterized complexity
1 Introduction
Group decision making plays an important role in multi-agent systems. Imagine for
instance a setN of agents who have to determine those among them who are eligible
or qualified to complete a task. In such a case the view of all agents has to be taken
into account and a rule for the selection of a subset of N should be specified. In
this paper we consider a specific decision making model in which each individual
qualifies or disqualifies every individual in N , and then a social rule is applied to
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select the socially qualified individuals. This model has been widely studied under
the name group identification in economics (see [8] for a survey). In particular, the
liberal rule, the class of consent rules, the consensus-start-respecting rule (CSR), and
the liberal-start-respecting rule (LSR) have been axiomatically characterized in the
literature [9,23,25,32,34]. Under the liberal rule, an individual is socially qualified
if and only if this individual qualifies herself. Each rule in the class of consent social
rules is characterized by two positive integers s and t. Specifically, if an individual
qualifies herself, then this individual is socially qualified if and only if there are at
least s− 1 other individuals who also qualify her. On the other hand, if the individual
disqualifies herself, then this individual is not socially qualified if and only if there
are at least t − 1 other individuals who also disqualify her. Finally, the CSR and
the LSR social rules recursively determine the socially qualified individuals. In the
beginning, the set KL of individuals each of whom qualifies herself are considered
LSR socially qualified, while the setKC of individuals each of whom is qualified by
all individuals are considered CSR socially qualified. Then, in each iteration for the
social rule LSR (resp. CSR), an individual a is added to KL (resp. KC) if there is
an individual in KL (resp. KC ) qualifying a. The iteration terminates when no new
individual can be added to KL (resp.KC ), and the socially qualified individuals are
the ones inKL (resp.KC).
In this paper, we consider the problems where an external (strategic) agent has an
incentive to control the results by either adding some individuals (GCAI), or deleting
some individuals (GCDI), or partitioning the set of individuals (GCPI). In particular,
in each problem the external agent has a subset S of individuals and the goal of
the external agent is to make all individuals in S socially qualified (see Section 2.2
for the precise definitions of the GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI problems). We study the
complexity of these problems for the liberal rule, the class of consent rules, and the
CSR and LSR rules, aiming to show how hard a given problem is. We achieve both
polynomial-time solvability results and NP-hardness results for these problems. In
particular, we obtain dichotomy results for all problems considered in this paper for
consent rules, with respect to the values of s and t. In addition, we study the NP-hard
problems from the parameterized complexity point of view, and obtain several fixed-
parameter tractability results, with respect to |S|. See Table 1 for a summary of our
main findings.
To the best of our knowledge, group identification as a classic model for identify-
ing socially qualified individuals has not been studied from the complexity point of
view 1. The words “control by adding/deleting/partitioning of” in the names of the
group identification control problems are reminiscent of many strategic voting pro-
blems, such as control by adding/deleting/partitioning of voters/candidates, which
have been extensively studied in the literature [2,15,16,31,36,37]. In a voting sys-
tem, we have a set of candidates and a set of voters. Each voter casts a vote, and a
voting correspondence is used to select a subset of candidates. From this standpoint,
group identification can be considered as a voting system where the individuals are
both voters and candidates. Nevertheless, group identification differs from voting sys-
1 After the workshop version of the current paper, Erde´lyi, Reger, and Yang studied the complexity
of destructive control, bribery, and possibly/necessarily socially qualified individuals problems in group
identification [13,14].
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Table 1 A summary of the complexity of the GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI problems. In the table, “NP-h”
stands for “NP-hard”, “P” stands for “polynomial-time solvable”, and “I” stands for “immune”. The NP-
hardness results with the symbol “+” next to them mean that the problems are fixed-parameter tractable
(FPT) with respect to |S|, where S is the set of individuals the strategic agent wants to make socially
qualified (for the precise definition of S, see the definitions of GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI in Section 2.2).
consent rules f(s,t)
s = 1 s ≥ 2 fCSR fLSR
t = 1 t = 2 t ≥ 3 t = 1 t = 2 t ≥ 3
GCAI I I I NP-h (+) NP-h (+) NP-h (+) NP-h NP-h
GCDI I P NP-h (+) I P NP-h (+) P I
GCPI I NP-h NP-h I NP-h NP-h ? I
tems in many significant aspects. First, the goal of a voting system is to select a subset
of candidates, who are often called winners since they are considered as more com-
petitive or outstanding compared with the remaining candidates for some specific
purpose. Despite that the goal of group identification is also to identify a set of in-
dividuals (socially qualified individuals) from the entire set of individuals, it does
not imply that socially qualified individuals are more competitive or outstanding than
the remaining individuals. For instance, in situations where we want to identify left-
wing party members among a group of people, the model of group identification is
more suitable. In other words, group identification is closer to a classification model.
Second, as voting systems aim to select a subset of competitive candidates for some
special purpose, more often than not, the number of winners is pre-decided (e.g., in
a single-winner voting, exactly one candidate is selected as the winner). As a conse-
quence, many voting systems need to adopt a certain tie-breaking method to break
the tie when many candidates are considered equally competitive. However, group
identification does not need a tie-breaking method, since there is no bound on the
number of socially qualified individuals.
It is also worth pointing out that the classic voting system Approval, which has
been widely studied in the literature [3,18,22,28,30,38], has the flavor of group iden-
tification. In Approval voting, each voter approves or disapproves each candidate.
Thus, each voter’s vote is represented by a 1-0 vector, where the entries with 1s (resp.
0s) mean that the voter approves (resp. disapproves) the corresponding candidate.
The winners are among the candidates which get the most approvals. If the voters
and candidates are the same group of individuals, then it seems that Approval vot-
ing is a social rule. Nevertheless, as discussed above, Approval voting is more often
considered as a single-winner voting system and thus needs to utilize a tie-breaking
method. Recently, several variants of Approval voting have been studied as multi-
winner voting systems. However, the number of winners is bounded by (or exactly
equal to) an integer (see, e.g., [1,27]). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, com-
plexity of control by adding/deleting/partitioning of voters/candidates has not been
studied for Approval voting when the voters and candidates coincide.
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Recently, multiwinner voting where the number of winners is not fixed has also
been studied (see, e.g., [4,17,26,39]). However, these rules are completely different
from what we study in the paper. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, to date
only the very recent papers [17] and [39] (which appeared after the workshop ver-
sion of our paper) considered such multiwinner voting from the complexity point of
view. However, they mainly considered the winner determination problem while we
consider control problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce
the studied social rules, the NP-hard problems we make use of in our proofs, as well
as the studied group control problems. Section 3 is then devoted to the study of the
control problems when the corresponding aggregation rule is a consent rule, while in
Section 4 we study these problems with respect to the procedural rules. We assume
then in Section 5 that the size of the group of individuals to be made socially qualified
is bounded and study the fixed-parameter tractability of the group control problems.
We conclude our work and offer some directions for future research in Section 6.
2 Basic notation and definitions
Throughout this paper we will need the following basic notions and concepts.
2.1 Social rules
Let N be a set of individuals. We assume that each individual a ∈ N has an opinion
about who from the set N possesses a certain qualification and who does not. For
a′ ∈ N , we write ϕ(a, a′) = 1 to denote the fact that a qualifies a′, and ϕ(a, a′) = 0
to denote the fact that a disqualifies a′. The mapping ϕ : N ×N → {0, 1} is called
a profile over N . A social rule is a function f assigning a subset f(ϕ, T ) ⊆ T to
each pair (ϕ, T ) consisting of a profile ϕ over N and a subset T ⊆ N . We call the
individuals in f(ϕ, T ) the socially qualified individuals of T with respect to f and ϕ.
In what follows we focus our analysis on the class of consent rules introduced
by Samet and Schmeidler [34] and on the procedural rules for group identification
axiomatically studied in [9].
Consent rules f (s,t). Each consent rule f (s,t) is specified by two positive integers
s and t such that for every T ⊆ N and every individual a ∈ T ,
1. if ϕ(a, a) = 1, then a ∈ f (s,t)(ϕ, T ) if and only if |{a′ ∈ T | ϕ(a′, a) = 1}| ≥ s,
and
2. if ϕ(a, a) = 0, then a 6∈ f (s,t)(ϕ, T ) if and only if |{a′ ∈ T | ϕ(a′, a) = 0}| ≥ t.
Notice that if an individual qualifies (disqualifies) herself but lacks the qualifi-
cation (disqualification) of at least s − 1 (t − 1) other individuals, then she will be
socially disqualified/qualified. The two positive integers s and t are referred to as the
consent quotas of the rule f (s,t). It is worth mentioning that in the original defini-
tion of consent rules by Samet and Schmeidler [34] there is an additional condition
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s+ t ≤ n+ 2 for consent quotas s and t to satisfy, where n is the number of indivi-
duals. Indeed, the condition s + t ≤ n + 2 is crucial for the consent rules to satisfy
the monotonicity property requiring a socially qualified individual a to be still so-
cially qualified when someone who disqualifies a turns to qualify a. Since our paper
is mainly concerned with the computational complexity of group control problems,
we drop this condition from the definition of the consent rules (we indeed achieve
results for a more general class of social rules that encapsulates the original consent
rules defined in the work of Samet and Schmeidler [34]). When studying the group
control problems for the consent rules f (s,t) we assume that the consent quotas s and
t remain the same, that is, they do not change after adding new individuals, deleting
old ones, or partitioning the set of individuals. Finally, we would like to point out that
the consent rule f (1,1) is also referred to as the liberal rule in the literature [34].
Consensus-start-respecting rule fCSR. For every T ⊆ N , this rule determines
the socially qualified individuals iteratively. First, all individuals who are qualified by
everyone in the society are considered socially qualified. Then, in each iteration, all
individuals who are qualified by at least one of the currently socially qualified indi-
viduals are added to the set of socially qualified individuals. The iterations terminate
when no new individual is added. Formally, for every T ⊆ N , let
KC0 (ϕ, T ) = {a ∈ T | ∀a
′ ∈ T, ϕ(a′, a) = 1}.
For each positive integer ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , let
KCℓ (ϕ, T ) = K
C
ℓ−1(ϕ, T ) ∪ {a ∈ T | ∃a
′ ∈ KCℓ−1(ϕ, T ), ϕ(a
′, a) = 1}.
Then fCSR(ϕ, T ) = KCℓ (ϕ, T ) for some ℓ such thatK
C
ℓ (ϕ, T ) = K
C
ℓ−1(ϕ, T ).
Liberal-start-respecting rule fLSR. This rule is similar to fCSR with the only
difference that the initial socially qualified individuals are those who qualify them-
selves. In particular, for every T ⊆ N , let
KL0 (ϕ, T ) = {a ∈ T | ϕ(a, a) = 1}.
For each positive integer ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , let
KLℓ (ϕ, T ) = K
L
ℓ−1(ϕ, T ) ∪ {a ∈ T | ∃a
′ ∈ KLℓ−1(ϕ, T ), ϕ(a
′, a) = 1}.
Then fLSR(ϕ, T ) = KLℓ (ϕ, T ) for some ℓ such thatK
L
ℓ (ϕ, T ) = K
L
ℓ−1(ϕ, T ).
Clearly, when KC0 (resp. K
L
0 ) is empty we have that f
CSR(ϕ, T ) = ∅ (resp.
fLSR(ϕ, T ) = ∅).
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2.2 Group control
Let us now formally state the three group control problemswe study. In the following,
let f be a social rule.
Group Control by Adding Individuals (GCAI)
Input: A 5-tuple (N,ϕ, S, T, k) of a set N of individuals, a profile ϕ over N , two
nonempty subsets S, T ⊆ N such that S ⊆ T and S 6⊆ f(ϕ, T ), and a
positive integer k.
Question: Is there a subset U ⊆ N \ T such that |U | ≤ k and S ⊆ f(ϕ, T ∪ U)?
Group Control by Deleting Individuals (GCDI)
Input: A 4-tuple (N,ϕ, S, k) of a setN of individuals, a profileϕ overN , a nonempty
subset S ⊆ N such that S 6⊆ f(ϕ,N), and a positive integer k.
Question: Is there a subset U ⊆ N \ S such that |U | ≤ k and S ⊆ f(ϕ,N \ U)?
Group Control by Partitioning of Individuals (GCPI)
Input: A 3-tuple (N,ϕ, S) of a set N of individuals, a profile ϕ over N , and a
nonempty subset S ⊆ N such that S 6⊆ f(ϕ,N).
Question: Is there a subset U ⊆ N such that S ⊆ f(ϕ, V ) where
V = f(ϕ,U) ∪ f(ϕ,N \ U)?
We say that a social rule is immune to a control type if it is impossible to make
a socially disqualified individual a ∈ S socially qualified by carrying out the cor-
responding operations (i.e., adding individuals, deleting individuals, or partitioning
the set of individuals). If a social rule is not immune to a control type involved in a
problem defined above, we say it is susceptible to the control type.
2.3 Some NP-hard problems
Our NP-hardness results in this paper are shown by efficient reductions from the fol-
lowing NP-hard problems: a restricted version of EXACT COVER BY THREE-SETS
(RX3C), LABELED RED-BLUE DOMINATING SET (LRBDS), and 3-SATISFIABILITY
(3-SAT). The formal definitions of these problems are as follows.
RESTRICTED VERSION OF EXACT COVER BY THREE-SETS (RX3C)
Input: A finite set X with |X | = 3κ for some positive integer κ and a collection C
of 3-subsets of X such that every x ∈ X occurs in exactly three 3-subsets in
C. So, it holds that |C| = 3κ.
Question: Is there a subcollection C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| = κ and each x ∈ X appears in
exactly one set of C′?
The NP-hardness of RX3C is shown in [21] (Theorem A.1).
In order to state the second NP-hard problem, we will need the following basic
notions from graph theory. We consider only undirected graphs. A graph is a tuple
(W,E)whereW is the vertex set andE is the edge set. A vertex v dominates a vertex
u if there is an edge between v and u. A vertex subset A dominates another vertex
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subset B, if for every vertex u ∈ B there is some vertex v ∈ A that dominates u. An
independent set I of a graph is a vertex subset such that there is no edge between each
pair of vertices in I . A bipartite graph is a graph whose vertex set can be partitioned
into two independent sets. We denote by (L ⊎ R,E) a bipartite graph with (L,R)
being a partition of its vertex set such that both L and R are independent sets. We
refer to the textbook of West [35] for further details on graphs.
We can now state the second NP-hard problem we will use in the next sections.
LABELED RED-BLUE DOMINATING SET (LRBDS)
Input: A bipartite graph G = (R ⊎ B,E), where each vertex in R has a label from
{1, 2, . . . , k}. For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, let Ri be the set of all vertices in
R that have label i.
Question: Is there a subsetW ⊆ R such that |W ∩ Ri| ≤ 1 for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
andW dominatesB?
The following additional notions will be needed as to state the third NP-hard
problem mentioned above. A Boolean variable x takes either the value 1 or 0. LetX
be a set of Boolean variables. If x ∈ X , then x and x¯ are literals overX . A clause c
over X is a set of literals over X . A truth assignment is a function ̺ : X → {0, 1}.
A clause c is satisfied under a truth assignment ̺ if and only if there is an x in c
such that ̺(x) = 1, or a x¯ in c such that ̺(x) = 0. The 3-SATISFIABILITY problem
defined below is a famous NP-hard problem [6,20].
3-SATISFIABILITY (3-SAT)
Input: A set X of Boolean variables, and a collection C of clauses overX such that
each clause includes exactly three literals.
Question: Is there a truth assignment ̺ : X → {0, 1} under which all clauses in C are
satisfied?
3 Consent rules
We start our analysis by investigating the group control problems with respect to con-
sent rules. Section 3.1 describes the subclass of rules that turn out to be immune to
(some of) these control types. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we then explore the computa-
tional complexity of group control problems for consent rules that are susceptible to
the corresponding control types.
3.1 Immune consent rules
The intrinsic property of the consent rule f (1,1) is that it completely leaves to each
individual to determine her own social qualification. Put it another way, whether an
individual is socially qualified is independent of the opinions of any other individual.
As a consequence, the answers to the question whether an individual is socially qual-
ified before and after the operations in the corresponding group control problems are
the same, as implied by the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 The consent rule f (1,1) is immune to GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI.
Proof Consider instances of the GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI problems with the con-
sent rule f (1,1) as their social rule. Notice that, as an assumption on instances, S *
f (1,1)(ϕ, T ) with S ⊆ T is imposed in GCAI, while S * f (1,1)(ϕ,N) is imposed
in both GCDI and GCPI. Due to the definition of f (1,1), each of the above assump-
tions implies that there exists an individual a ∈ S such that ϕ(a, a) = 0, and hence,
a 6∈ f (1,1)(ϕ, V ) for every V ⊆ N . It follows that S 6⊆ f (1,1)(ϕ, V ) for every
S ⊆ V ⊆ N . Therefore, for all instances with f (1,1) as the social rule, the answers
to GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI are always “NO”. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Let us now turn to consent rules f (s,1) and f (1,t) with s, t ≥ 2. In order to change
the social status of an individual a from disqualified to qualified when f (s,1) is ap-
plied, one needs the number of supporters of a to increase, but neither deleting indi-
viduals nor partitioning the set of individuals seems to create additional support. On
the other hand, when the applied rule is f (1,t), the number of people who disqualify
a does not decrease when adding individuals. Our next result confirms this intuition
with respect to the corresponding control problems.
Theorem 2 Every consent rule f (s,1) with s ≥ 2 is immune to GCDI and GCPI, and
every consent rule f (1,t) with t ≥ 2 is immune to GCAI.
Proof We first consider consent rules f (s,1) with s ≥ 2. Let a ∈ S be an individual
who is not socially qualified, i.e., a 6∈ f (s,1)(ϕ,N). We distinguish between two
cases.
Case ϕ(a, a) = 1: There are at most s− 1 individuals in N qualifying individual a,
i.e., |{a′ ∈ N | ϕ(a′, a) = 1}| < s, and thus |{a′ ∈ V | ϕ(a′, a) = 1}| < s
for every V ⊆ N . Therefore, it is impossible to make individual a ∈ S socially
qualified by deleting or partitioning the set of individuals.
Case ϕ(a, a) = 0: By definition, each consent rule f satisfies f(ϕ, V ) ⊆ V , and
hence, S 6⊆ f (s,1)(ϕ, V ) if S 6⊆ V ; otherwise, when S ⊆ V , we have |{a′ ∈
V | ϕ(a′, a) = 0}| ≥ 1 from ϕ(a, a) = 0, which implies that a 6∈ f (s,1)(ϕ, V ).
Hence, it is impossible to make individual a socially qualified by deleting or
partitioning the set of individuals, i.e., S 6⊆ f (s,1)(ϕ, V ) for any V ⊆ N .
Therefore, for each instance with f (s,1) as its social rule, the answers to GCDI and
GCPI are always “NO”.
Consider now the consent rule f (1,t). Let a ∈ S be an individual which is not so-
cially qualified, that is a 6∈ f (1,t)(ϕ, T ). This implies that ϕ(a, a) = 0 and, moreover,
there are at least t individuals a′ (including a) in T such that ϕ(a′, a) = 0. Therefore,
no matter which individuals the set U includes, there will be still at least t individuals
a′ ∈ T ∪U such that ϕ(a′, a) = 0, implying that a is still not socially qualified. ⊓⊔
In the remaining subsections we show how the interplay between the consent quo-
tas s and t shapes the extent to which the corresponding consent rules are susceptible
to all the three group control types.
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3.2 Polynomial-time solvability
We start with the GCDI problem for consent rules f (s,2) with s ≥ 1. In order to show
that every such rule is not immune to this group control type, we need only to give an
instance where one can make all individuals in S socially qualified by deleting a lim-
ited number of individuals, given that not all individuals in S are socially qualified in
advance. To this end, consider an instance (N = {a, b} , ϕ, S = {a} , k = 1) where
ϕ(a, a) = ϕ(b, a) = 0. It is clear that one can make a socially qualified by deleting b
from the instance. As our next result reveals, it is practically tractable for a designer
to control a group identification procedure by deleting individuals, provided that the
social rule is f (s,2).
Theorem 3 The GCDI problem for every consent rule f (s,2) with s ≥ 1 is polynomial-
time solvable.
Proof Let L = {a ∈ S | ϕ(a, a) = 1} and L¯ = S \ L = {a ∈ S | ϕ(a, a) = 0}.
For each a ∈ L¯, let Ua ⊆ N be the set of individuals each of whom is outside S and
disqualifies a, i.e., Ua = {a′ ∈ N \ S | ϕ(a′, a) = 0}. Moreover, let U =
⋃
a∈L¯ Ua.
We develop a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem stated in the theorem as
follows: it returns “NO” if S 6⊆ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) or |U | > k, and otherwise returns
“YES”.
The correctness of the algorithm is shown based on the following observations.
According to the consent rule f (s,2), a ∈ L¯ is socially qualified if there is no indi-
vidual a′ 6= a such that ϕ(a′, a) = 0. Therefore, in order to make a ∈ L¯ socially
qualified, all individuals a′ ∈ N \ S with ϕ(a′, a) = 0 have to be deleted. This
directly implies that all individuals in U , as defined above, have to be deleted.
Now let us consider f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U). Suppose S 6⊆ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U), and let
a ∈ S \ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U). We distinguish between the following two cases.
Case a ∈ L: According to the consent rule f (s,2), there are at most s− 1 individuals
a′ ∈ N\U such thatϕ(a′, a) = 1. Since deleting individuals does not increase the
number of individuals who qualify a, the individual a cannot be socially qualified
after deleting some individuals. Thus, the given instance is a NO-instance.
Case a ∈ L¯: In this case, there is an individuala′ ∈ S such that a′ 6= a andϕ(a′, a) =
0. Since we cannot delete individuals in S due to the definition of the problem, in-
dividual a cannot be socially qualified. Thus, the given instance is a NO-instance.
Due to the above analysis, if S 6⊆ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \U), we can safely return “NO”. Since
we are allowed to delete at most k individuals, and according to the above analysis
all individuals in U must be deleted, if |U | > k, we can safely return “NO” too. On
the other hand, if S ⊆ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) and |U | ≤ k, U itself is an evidence for
answering “YES”.
Finally, observe that the construction of the set U , and the decisions of S ⊆
f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) and |U | ≤ k can be done in O(|N |2) time. This completes the
proof. ⊓⊔
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3.3 NP-hardness
In contrast to the polynomial-time solvability of the GCDI problem for consent rules
f (s,2) with s ≥ 1, we prove in this section that the same problem for consent rules
with quotas s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 becomes NP-hard. Theorem 4 additionally shows that
the GCAI problem for consent rules with quotas s ≥ 2 and t ≥ 1 is NP-hard, too. It
should be also noted that the instances in our NP-hardness reductions directly imply
that every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 2 and t ≥ 1 is susceptible to GCAI, and every
consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 is susceptible to GCDI.
Theorem 4 The GCAI problem for every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 2 and t ≥ 1,
and the GCDI problem for every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 are NP-
hard.
Proof We prove the theorem by reductions from the RX3C problem. Let’s first con-
sider the GCAI problem for consent rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1. Given an instance
I = (X, C) of RX3C with |X | = 3κ, we create an instance EI = (N,ϕ, S, T, k)
of GCAI for f (s,t) as follows.
There are |X |+ |C| individuals in N = {ax | x ∈ X} ∪ {ac | c ∈ C}. The first
|X | individuals {ax | x ∈ X} one-to-one correspond to the elements in X , and the
last |C| individuals {ac | c ∈ C} one-to-one correspond to elements in C. We define
S = T = {ax ∈ N | x ∈ X}. In addition, we set k = κ. Now we define the profile
ϕ.
1. For each x, x′ ∈ X , ϕ(ax, ax′) = 1 if and only if x = x′.
2. For each x ∈ X and for each c ∈ C, ϕ(ac, ax) = 1 if and only if x ∈ c.
3. For each c, c′ ∈ C, ϕ(ac, ac′) = 0.
For the proof, the values of ϕ(ax, ac) where x ∈ X and c ∈ C are not essential.
Obviously, the construction of EI can be done in polynomial time.
Now we prove the correctness of the reduction, i.e., we show that I is a YES-
instance of RX3C if and only if EI is a YES-instance of GCAI.
(⇒:) Suppose I is a YES-instance for RX3C, and let C′ ⊆ C be an exact 3-set
cover, i.e., |C′| = κ and for every x ∈ X there exists a c ∈ C′ such that x ∈ c. Let
U = {ac ∈ N | c ∈ C′}. Then, according to the definition of ϕ, for each ax ∈ S,
there exists an ac ∈ U such that ϕ(ac, ax) = 1. Moreover, each ax ∈ S qualifies
herself (i.e., ϕ(ax, ax) = 1). Therefore, according to the definition of the consent
rule f (2,t), ax ∈ f (2,t)(ϕ, T ∪ U) for every ax ∈ S, i.e., S ⊆ f (2,t)(ϕ, T ∪ U). By
definition, we have |U | = |C′| = k = κ. Therefore, EI is a YES-instance for GCAI.
(⇐:) Suppose EI is a YES-instance for GCAI, and let U ⊆ N \ T be a set of
individuals such that |U | ≤ k = κ and S ⊆ f (2,t)(ϕ, T ∪U). From S ⊆ f (2,t)(ϕ, T ∪
U) and, for all ax, ax′ ∈ S = T , ϕ(ax, ax′) = 1 if and only if x = x′, it follows that,
for each ax ∈ S, there is an ac ∈ U such that ϕ(ac, ax) = 1. Then, according to the
definition of the profile ϕ, for each x ∈ X , there exists c ∈ C such that ac ∈ U and
x ∈ c. This implies that C′ = {c ∈ C | ac ∈ U} is an exact 3-set cover of I. Thus, I
is a YES-instance.
The NP-hardness reduction for the problemGCAI for any consent rule f (s,t) with
s > 2 and t ≥ 1 can be adapted from the above reduction. Precisely, we introduce
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further s − 2 dummy individuals in T , and let all these dummy individuals qualify
every individual in S = {ax ∈ N | x ∈ X}. The opinions of a dummy individual
over any other individual in N and the other way around do not matter in the proof,
and thus can be set arbitrarily. Now for each individual ax ∈ S, there are exactly s−1
individuals in T who qualify ax. Moreover, in order to make each ax ∈ S socially
qualified, we need one more individual in N \ T who qualifies ax.
Now let’s consider the GCDI problem for consent rules f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and
t ≥ 3. We first consider the case t = 3. The reduction for this problem is similar to
the above reduction for the GCAI problem for consent rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1 with
the following differences.
1. There is no T in this reduction; but keeping S = {ax ∈ N | x ∈ X}.
2. The values of ϕ(a, b) for every a, b ∈ N are reversed. That is, we have ϕ(a, b) =
1 in the current reduction if and only if ϕ(a, b) = 0 in the above reduction for
GCAI.
3. k = 2κ.
Now we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Suppose that there is an exact 3-set cover C′ ⊂ C for I, i.e., |C′| = κ and for
every x ∈ X there exists exactly one c ∈ C′ such that x ∈ c. LetU = {ac | c ∈ C\C′}
and U ′ = {ac | c ∈ C
′}. Clearly, S ∩ U = ∅. Moreover,N \ U = S ∪ U ′. Let ax be
an individual in S where x ∈ X . Then, according to the construction, there is exactly
one ac ∈ U ′ such that ϕ(ac, ax) = 0. Since ϕ(ax′ , ax) = 1 for all ax′ ∈ S \ {ax},
according to the consent rule f (s,3), ax ∈ f (s,3)(ϕ,N \U). Since this holds for every
ax ∈ S, we can conclude that S ⊆ f (s,3)(ϕ,N \ U).
(⇐:) Suppose that there is a U ⊆ N \ S such that |U | ≤ 2κ and
S ⊆ f (s,3)(ϕ,N \ U).
Let U ′ = N \ (S ∪ U) and C′ = {c ∈ C | ac ∈ U
′}. Thus, N \ U = S ∪ U ′. Due
to the fact that ϕ(ax, ax) = 0 for every ax ∈ S where x ∈ X and the definition of ϕ,
it holds that for every ax ∈ S, there is at most one ac ∈ U ′ such that ϕ(ac, ax) = 0
and x ∈ c. Due to the construction, every individual ac ∈ U ′ disqualifies exactly 3
individuals in S. Then, from |S| = 3κ it follows that |U ′| ≤ κ. In addition, from
|U | ≤ 2κ, we obtain that |U ′| = 3κ − |U | ≥ κ. Hence, it must be that |U ′| = k. It
follows that every individual ax is disqualified by exactly one individual ac ∈ U ′ such
that x ∈ X, c ∈ C′, and x ∈ c. This implies that the subcollection C′ corresponding
to U ′ is an exact 3-set cover of I.
The proof of NP-hardness of the problem for any consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1
and t > 3 can be adapted from the above reduction by introducing some dummy
individuals. In particular, we introduce further t − 3 individuals in S. Let S′ denote
the set of the t − 3 dummy individuals. Thus, S = {ax ∈ N | x ∈ X} ∪ S
′. We
want each dummy individual in S′ to be a robust socially qualified individual, that is,
every d ∈ S′ is socially qualified regardless of which individuals (at most k = 2κ)
would be deleted. To this end, for every d ∈ S′, we let d disqualify herself, and let all
the other individuals qualify d. We set ϕ(d, ax) = 0 for every d ∈ S′ and ax where
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x ∈ X . Thus, for every ax ∈ S where x ∈ X , there are in total t + 1 individuals
in N who disqualify ax. The other entries in the profile not defined above can be set
arbitrarily. In order to make each ax ∈ S where x ∈ X socially qualified, we need to
delete exactly two individuals in N \ S who disqualify ax. This happens if and only
if there is an exact 3-set cover for I, as we discussed in the proof for the consent rule
f (s,3). ⊓⊔
Even though consent rules f (s,t) with s ≥ 2 (resp. f (s,t) with t ≥ 3) are suscep-
tible to GCAI (resp. GCDI), Theorem 4 reveals that it is a computationally hard task
for a designer to successfully control a group identification procedure in these cases
by adding (resp. deleting) individuals.
Let us now turn to the GCPI problem. We have shown in Theorems 1 and 2 that
every consent rule f (s,1) with s ≥ 1 is immune to this control type. In order to
show that consent rules with t > 1 are susceptible to GCPI, consider an instance
(N,ϕ, S) where t ≥ 2, N = {a1, a2, . . . , at+1}, ϕ(ai, aj) = 0 for every i, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , t+ 1}, i.e., everyone disqualifies everyone, and S = {a1}. Clearly, no in-
dividual is socially qualified, i.e., f (s,t)(ϕ,N) = ∅. Consider now the partition (U =
{a1}, N \ {a1}) ofN and note that f (s,t)(ϕ,U) = S. Moreover, for every individual
ai ∈ N \U , at least t individuals inN \U disqualify ai and thus f (s,t)(ϕ,N \U) = ∅.
We have then S = {a1} = f (s,t)(ϕ, f (s,t)(ϕ,U) ∪ f (s,t)(ϕ,N \ U)), showing the
susceptibility of the consent rule to GCPI. Our next result reveals that, in fact, manip-
ulation by partitioning the set of individuals is NP-hard, provided that the social rule
is f (s,t) with t ≥ 2.
Theorem 5 The GCPI problem for every consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 2 is
NP-hard.
Proof We prove the NP-hardness of the problem stated in the theorem by a reduction
from the 3-SAT problem.We first consider the GCPI problem for consent rules f (s,2)
with s ≥ 1. Later, we extend the reduction to all consent rules f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and
t ≥ 3.
Let (X,C) be an instance of the 3-SAT problem, where X is the set of Boolean
variables and C is the set of clauses each consisting of three literals. Moreover, let
m and n be the numbers of variables and clauses, respectively, i.e., m = |X | and
n = |C|. We construct an instance E = (N,ϕ, S) of GCPI for f (s,2) as follows.
There are in total 2m + n + 1 individuals in N . In particular, for each vari-
able x ∈ X and each clause c ∈ C, we create the individuals a(x, 1), a(x, 2),
and a(c), respectively. Moreover, we create one individual a(C) for C. We set S =
{a(x, 1) | x ∈ X} ∪ {a(C)} and define the profile ϕ as follows.
1. For each a ∈ N , ϕ(a, a) = 0.
2. For each x ∈ X , ϕ(a(x, 2), a(x, 1)) = 0.
3. For each c ∈ C, ϕ(a(c), a(C)) = 0.
4. For each x ∈ X , ϕ(a(C), a(x, 2)) = 0.
5. For each x ∈ X and c ∈ C, ϕ(a(c), a(x, 2)) = 0.
6. For each c ∈ C and every variable x involved in c, ϕ(a(x, 2), a(c)) = 0 if x ∈ c
and ϕ(a(x, 1), a(c)) = 0 if x¯ ∈ c.
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Table 2 This table summarizes, for each individual a ∈ N , the set of individuals qualifying a and the set
of individuals disqualifying a, according to the profile ϕ in the proof of Theorem 5.
qualified by disqualified by
a(x, 1) N \ {a(x, 1), a(x, 2)} a(x, 1), a(x, 2)
a(x, 2) N \ ({a(x, 2), a(C)} ∪ {a(c) | c ∈ C})
a(x, 2), a(C), and
a(c) for each c ∈ C
a(C) N \ ({a(c) | c ∈ C} ∪ {a(C)})
a(C) and
a(c) for every c ∈ C
a(c) N \ ({a(x, 2) | x ∈ c} ∪ {a(x, 1) | x¯ ∈ c} ∪ {a(c)})
a(c),
a(x, 2) for every x ∈ c,
a(x, 1) for every x¯ ∈ c
7. For every two a, a′ ∈ N such that ϕ(a, a′) is not defined above, ϕ(a, a′) = 1.
Now we prove that (X,C) is a YES-instance if and only if E is a YES-instance.
Table 2 is helpful for the reader to check the following arguments.
(⇒:) Assume that there is a truth assignment ̺ : X → {0, 1}. Then, we find
a U ⊆ N as follows. First, in U we include the individual a(C) and exclude all
individuals in {a(c) | c ∈ C}, i.e., a(C) ∈ U and {a(c) | c ∈ C} ⊆ N \ U . In
addition, for each x ∈ X , U includes exactly one of {a(x, 1), a(x, 2)}, depending on
the value of ̺(x). In particular, for every x ∈ X , a(x, 1) ∈ U and a(x, 2) ∈ N \U if
̺(x) = 1; and a(x, 2) ∈ U and a(x, 1) ∈ N \ U ; otherwise. Now let’s consider the
subprofiles f (s,2)(ϕ,U) and f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U). Since the only individual in U who
disqualifies a(C) is a(C) herself, it holds that a(C) ∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,U). Let x be any
variable in X . Due to the above definition of U , the individuals a(x, 2) and a(x, 1)
are not included in the same element of the partition (U,N \ U) of N . Since the
only individuals who disqualify a(x, 1) are a(x, 1) and a(x, 2), it holds that a(x, 1)
survives the first stage of selection, i.e., a(x, 1) ∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,U) if a(x, 1) ∈ U and
a(x, 1) ∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) if a(x, 1) ∈ N \ U . On the other hand, since a(C) and
all individuals in {a(c) | c ∈ C} disqualify every individual in {a(x, 2) | x ∈ X},
none of {a(x, 2) | x ∈ X} survives the first stage of selection, i.e., for every x ∈ X it
holds that a(x, 2) 6∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,W ) whereW ∈ {U,N \U} and a(x, 2) ∈W . Now we
consider the individuals corresponding to the clauses. Let c ∈ C be a clause. Since
c is satisfied under ̺, there is either an x ∈ c such that ̺(x) = 1, or a x¯ ∈ c such
that ̺(x) = 0. In the former case, we have a(x, 2) ∈ N \ U,ϕ(a(x, 2), a(c)) = 0,
and in the latter case we have a(x, 1) ∈ N \ U,ϕ(a(x, 1), a(c)) = 0. Hence, both
cases lead a(c) to be eliminated in the first stage of selection, i.e., {a(c) | c ∈ C} ∩
f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) = ∅. As a summary, f (s,2)(ϕ,U) ∪ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) = S. Since
every individual in S is only disqualified by herself, i.e., ϕ(a′, a) = 0 if and only if
a′ = a for every a, a′ ∈ S, we have that S = f (s,2)(ϕ, S). This completes the proof
of this direction.
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(⇐:) Suppose that there is a U ⊆ N such that S ⊆ f (s,2)(ϕ, f (s,2)(ϕ,U) ∪
f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U)). Due to symmetry, assume that a(C) ∈ U . Since for every c ∈ C,
ϕ(a(c), a(C)) = 0, and a(C) ∈ S, it holds that {a(c) | c ∈ C} ⊆ N \U (otherwise,
a(C) would be eliminated in the subprofile restricted to U ). Moreover, it holds that
{a(c) | c ∈ C} ∩ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) = ∅. As a result, for every a(c), except herself,
there must be at least one other individual inN \U who disqualifies a(c). Due to the
definition of the profile, this means that there is either an x ∈ c such that a(x, 2) ∈
N \ U , or a x¯ ∈ c such that a(x, 1) ∈ N \ U . Since for every x ∈ X it holds
ϕ(a(x, 2), a(x, 1)) = ϕ(a(x, 1), a(x, 1)) = 0, exactly one of {a(x, 1), a(x, 2)} can
be in N \ U (otherwise, a(x, 1) would be eliminated in the first stage of selection).
Hence, given U , we can uniquely define a truth assignment ̺ as follows. For every
x ∈ X , define ̺(x) = 1 if a(x, 2) ∈ N \ U and a(x) = 0 otherwise. Then, due to
the above discussion, for every c ∈ C, there is either an x ∈ c such that ̺(x) = 1
or a x¯ ∈ c such that ̺(x) = 0. Therefore, every clause is satisfied under the truth
assignment ̺. This completes the proof of this direction.
Now, we explain how to extend the above reduction for each consent rule f (s,t)
with t ≥ 3. Assume that |C| ≥ t−1 (if this is not the case, we can duplicate any arbi-
trary clause to make the inequality hold). In addition to the individuals defined in the
above reduction,we further create 2t−4 dummy individualsa11, . . . , a
t−2
1 , a
1
2, . . . , a
t−2
2 ,
and include all individuals a11, . . . , a
t−2
1 in S. Let A1 = {a
1
1, . . . , a
t−2
1 } and A2 =
{a12, . . . , a
t−2
2 }. So we now have S = {a(x, 1) | x ∈ X} ∪ a(C) ∪ A1, and
N = S ∪ A2 ∪ {a(x, 2) | x ∈ X} ∪ {a(c) | c ∈ C}.
Every individual inA1 ∪A2 is disqualified by all individuals inA1 ∪A2. In addition,
all individuals inN \ (A1∪A2) disqualify every individual inA2, and all individuals
in N \ (A1 ∪ A2 ∪ {a(c) | c ∈ C}) qualify every individual in A1. Furthermore, all
individuals in {a(c) | c ∈ C} disqualify all individuals in A1. Finally, all individuals
in A1 ∪ A2 disqualify all individuals not in A1 ∪ A2. The subprofile restricted to
individuals not inA1 ∪A2 remains unchanged. Observe that, by defining so, to make
all individuals in A1 socially qualified, it has to be the case that for every solution
U the number of dummy individuals included in U and N \ U should be the same
(and equal to t− 2). Assume for the sake of contradiction that this is not the case. Let
U ⊆ N be a solution. Due to symmetry, we assume that |U ∩ (A1 ∪ A2)| ≥ t − 1.
Apparently,U includes at least one individual ai1 ∈ S∩A1. Moreover, all individuals
in {a(x, 1) | x ∈ X} ∪ {a(C)}, all of which are in S, must be partitioned into the
setN \U , since otherwise all of them will be eliminated in the first stage of selection
(i.e., for every a ∈ {a(x, 1) | x ∈ X} ∪ {a(C)} it holds that a 6∈ f (s,t)(ϕ,W )
where W ∈ {U,N \ U} and a ∈ W ). As a result, at most t − 2 individuals in
{a(c) | c ∈ C} can be included in N \ U , since otherwise the individual a(C) will
be eliminated, i.e., a(C) 6∈ f (s,t)(ϕ,N \ U). As |C| ≥ t − 1, there will be at least
one individual a(c) with c ∈ C in the set U . However, the individual a(c) together
with all other individuals in U ∩ (A1 ∪A2) will make a
i
1 be eliminated, contradicting
that U is a solution. The observation follows. The discussion for the observation also
implies that for every solution U ⊆ N , either A1 ⊆ U or A1 ⊆ N \ U , i.e., all
individuals inA1 must be included in the same element of the partition (U,N \U) of
N . Now, one can check that from every solution U of the instance constructed above
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for the consent rule f (s,2), we can get a solution for the instance constructed for the
consent rule f (s,t) with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 3 by adding all individuals A1 in U or N \ U
(if a(C) ∈ U then A1 ⊆ U ; otherwise A1 ⊆ N \ U ), and vice versa. This completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
4 Procedural rules
Each of the procedural rules for group identification introduced in Section 2 expands
an initial set of socially qualified individuals by adding new individuals. Hence, the
very definition of these rules invites us to start the analysis of whether they are sus-
ceptible to GCAI. We answer the question in the affirmative. As a matter of fact, we
show that GCAI for fLSR and GCAI for fCSR are both NP-hard, which directly
implies the susceptibility of the two procedural rules to GCAI.
Theorem 6 The GCAI problem for fLSR and the GCAI problem for fCSR are NP-
hard.
Proof We prove the theorem by reductions from the RX3C problem. Let’s first con-
sider the social rule fLSR. Given an instance I = (X, C) of RX3C with |X | = 3κ,
we create an instance EI = (N,ϕ, S, T, k) of GCAI for fLSR as follows.
The definitions ofN,S, T and k are the same as in the NP-hardness reduction for
GCAI for consent rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1 in Theorem 4. That is, N = {ax | x ∈
X} ∪ {ac | c ∈ C} is a set of |X | + |C| individuals, with the first |X | individuals
{ax | x ∈ X} one-to-one corresponding to the elements in X , and the last |C|
individuals {ac | c ∈ C} one-to-one corresponding to elements in C. In addition,
S = T = {ax ∈ N | x ∈ X}, and k = κ. The profile ϕ is defined as follows.
1. For each x, x′ ∈ X , ϕ(ax, ax′) = 0.
2. For each x ∈ X and each c ∈ C, ϕ(ax, ac) = 0.
3. For each c, c′ ∈ C, ϕ(ac, ac′) = 1 if and only if c = c′.
4. For each x ∈ X and each c ∈ C, ϕ(ac, ax) = 1 if and only if x ∈ c.
Now we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Suppose that there is an exact 3-set cover C′ ⊂ C for I, i.e., |C′| = k and for
every x ∈ X there exists exactly one c ∈ C′ such that x ∈ c. Let U = {ac | c ∈ C′}.
According to the definition of ϕ, it holds that U ⊆ fLSR(ϕ, T ∪ U). Moreover, for
every ax ∈ S with x ∈ X , there is an ac ∈ U such that ϕ(ac, ax) = 1 and x ∈ c.
Since U ⊆ fLSR(ϕ, T ∪ U), according to the definition of the social rule fLSR, it
holds that ax ∈ fLSR(ϕ, T ∪ U) for every ax ∈ S. Therefore, EI is a YES-instance
since it has a solution U .
(⇐:) Suppose that there is a U ⊆ N \ T such that |U | ≤ k and S = T ⊆
fLSR(ϕ, T ∪ U). Let C′ = {c ∈ C | ac ∈ U}. According to the definition of ϕ,
fLSR(ϕ, T ) = ∅. Moreover, every ax ∈ S with x ∈ X disqualifies all individuals in
N , and every ac ∈ N \T qualifies herself. As a result, for every ax ∈ S with x ∈ X ,
there must be at least one ac ∈ U with c ∈ C′ such that ϕ(ac, ax) = 1. According to
the definition of ϕ, this implies that for every x ∈ X , there is at least one c ∈ C′ such
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that x ∈ c. Since |C′| = |U | ≤ k = κ, this implies that |C′| = k and, more precisely,
C′ is an exact 3-set cover of I.
Now let’s consider the GCAI problem for fCSR. Again, the definitions ofN,S, T
and k are the same as in the NP-hardness reduction for the GCAI problem for consent
rules f (2,t) with t ≥ 1 in Theorem 4. The profile ϕ is defined as follows.
1. For each x, x′ ∈ X , ϕ(ax, ax′) = 0.
2. For each x ∈ X and each c ∈ C, ϕ(ax, ac) = 1.
3. For each c, c′ ∈ C, ϕ(ac, ac′) = 1.
4. For each x ∈ X and each c ∈ C, ϕ(ac, ax) = 1 if and only if x ∈ c.
Now we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Suppose that there is a C′ ⊂ C such that |C′| = k and for every x ∈ X
there exists exactly one c ∈ C′ such that x ∈ c. Let U = {ac | c ∈ C
′}. Clearly,
|U | = |C′| = k. Observe thatU ⊆ fCSR(ϕ, T ∪U). Then, according to the definition
of ϕ, it holds that for every ax ∈ S with x ∈ X , there is an ac ∈ U such that x ∈ c
and ϕ(ac, ax) = 1. This implies that ax ∈ fCSR(ϕ, T ∪ U) for every ax ∈ S. Thus,
EI is a YES-instance since it has a solution U .
(⇐:) Suppose that there is a subset U ⊆ N \ T such that |U | ≤ k and S =
T ⊆ fCSR(ϕ, T ∪ U). Let C′ = {c ∈ C | ac ∈ U}. According to the definition of
ϕ, fCSR(ϕ, T ) = ∅. Moreover, every individual in S disqualifies every individual
in S. Furthermore, every individual in N \ T is qualified by all individuals in N .
Therefore, for every ax ∈ S with x ∈ X , there must be at least one ac ∈ U such that
ϕ(ac, ax) = 1. According to the definition of ϕ, this implies that for every x ∈ X
there is at least one c ∈ C′ such that x ∈ c. Since |C′| = |U | ≤ k = κ, this implies
that |C′| = k and, more precisely, C′ is an exact 3-set cover of I. ⊓⊔
In contrast to the susceptibility of the procedural rules to GCAI, we show next
that fLSR turns out to be immune to the other two group control types. Intuitively, an
individual is not socially qualified if there are not enough individuals qualifying her.
Hence, deleting some individuals cannot make such an individual socially qualified;
it in fact can only make the situation worse for the individual.
Theorem 7 The social rule fLSR is immune to GCDI and GCPI.
Proof According to the definition of fLSR, an individual a ∈ N is a socially qualified
with respect to fLSR if and only if there is a sequence of individuals a0, a1, . . . , at
such that (1) at = a; (2) ϕ(a0, a0) = 1, i.e., a0 is in the initial set of socially qualified
individuals; and (3) ϕ(ai, ai+1) = 1 for every 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1. Clearly, if there is no
such path for an individual a, then after deleting some individuals such a path still
does not exist for a. Hence, fLSR is immune to GCDI. Moreover, for any partition
N1 andN2 ofN such a path also does not exist in the subprofile restricted to bothN1
and N2, if it does not exist in the overall profile. Hence, f
LSR is immune to GCPI
too. ⊓⊔
In contrast to the immunity of fLSR to GCDI and GCPI, we show that fCSR is
susceptible to GCDI and GCPI. Consider the instance where there are three indivi-
duals a, b, c and S = {a, b}. In addition, ϕ(a, a) = ϕ(a, b) = ϕ(b, b) = ϕ(b, a) = 1
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and ϕ(c, a) = ϕ(c, b) = ϕ(c, c) = 0. Then, initially no one is qualified by all in-
dividuals. Hence, there are no socially qualified individuals. However, after deleting
c both a and b become socially qualified individuals. In addition, if we partition the
individuals as ({a, b}, {c}), both a and b become socially qualified individuals too.
Next, we prove that GCDI for fCSR is polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 8 GCDI for fCSR is polynomial time solvable.
Proof To prove the theorem, we develop a polynomial-time algorithm. For an indi-
vidual a ∈ N , let D(a) be the set of individuals disqualifying a, i.e., D(a) = {a′ ∈
N | ϕ(a′, a) = 0}. The algorithm is as follows: return “YES” if and only if there is
an individual a ∈ N such that |D(a)| ≤ k and S ⊆ fCSR(ϕ,N \ D(a)). Clearly,
the algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time. It remains to prove its correct-
ness. Obviously, if the algorithm returns “YES”, the given instance must be a YES-
instance. Assume now that the given instance is a YES-instance. Let U ⊆ N \ S
be a solution of the given instance, i.e., |U | ≤ k and S ⊆ fCSR(ϕ,N \ U). Let
KCSR0 be the initial set of socially qualified individuals with respect to ϕ andN \U .
Clearly,
⋃
b′∈KCSR
0
D(b′) ⊆ U . Let b be any arbitrary individual inKCSR0 . We claim
that D(b) is also a solution. To check this, first observe that all individuals in KCSR0
qualify all individuals in KCSR0 , i.e., ϕ(c, c
′) = 1 for all c, c′ ∈ KCSR0 . Moreover,
according to the definition of fCSR, all individuals in KCSR0 are socially qualified
with respect to ϕ andN \D(b) (hint: b is socially qualified with respect to N \D(b)
and b qualifies everyone in KCSR0 as discussed above). This implies that all indivi-
duals in S are socially qualified with respect to ϕ and N \D(b). As D(b) ⊆ U and
|U | ≤ k, it holds that |D(b)| ≤ k. Hence, the individual b is a witness (i.e., b is the
individual a as described in the algorithm) that the algorithm returns “YES”. This
completes the proof. ⊓⊔
5 Bounded group size and parameterized complexity
We have shown in Theorems 4 and 5 that the GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI problems for
consent rules f (s,t) are NP-hard when either s or t exceeds some constant. Hence,
there are no polynomial-time algorithms for these problems unless P=NP. In this
section, we investigate how the size of the group S of people to be made socially
qualified affects the complexity of the problems studied in the previous section. In
particular, we study the GCAI, GCDI, and GCPI problems from the parameterized
complexity point of view, with respect to the size of S.
Parameterized complexity was introduced by Downey and Fellows [10] as a tool
to deal with hard problems. A parameterized problem is a language contained in
Σ∗×Σ∗, whereΣ is a finite alphabet. The first component is called the main part of
the problem and the second component is called the parameter. In this paper, we con-
sider only positive integer parameters. A parameterized problem is fixed-parameter
tractable (FPT) if it is solvable in O(f(k) · |I|O(1)) time, where I is the main part of
the instance, k is the parameter, and f(k) is a computable function depending only
on k. For further discussion on parameterized complexity, we refer to [7,11,33].
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We first study the GCAI and the GCDI problems for consent rules. In particular,
we prove that both the GCAI and GCDI problems for these rules are FPT with respect
to the size of S. To this end, we give integer linear programming (ILP) formulations
with the number of variables bounded by 2|S| for both problems. As ILP is FPT with
respect to the number of variables [19,24,29], so are the GCAI and GCDI problems
for the consent rules.
Lemma 1 [19,24,29] ILP can be solved using O(v2.5v+o(v) · L) arithmetic opera-
tions, where L is the number of bits in the input and v is the number of variables in
ILP.
Let us now describe the ILP formulations for both the GCAI problem and the
GCDI problem for consent rules.
Theorem 9 The GCAI and GCDI problems for every consent rule f (s,t) are FPT
with respect to the size of S.
Proof We prove the theorem by giving ILP formulations for the GCAI and GCDI
problems. The number of variables in the formulations is bounded by a function of
|S|. We first consider the GCAI problem.
Let (N,ϕ, S, T, k) be an instance of GCAI for f (s,t). Let µ = |S|. We say two
individuals a, b ∈ N have the same opinion over S, if for every c ∈ S, it holds that
ϕ(a, c) = ϕ(b, c). Hereinafter, let (a1, a2, . . . , an) be any arbitrary but fixed order
of N . Let S = {aλ(1), aλ(2), . . . , aλ(µ)} where 1 ≤ λ(i) < λ(j) ≤ n for every
1 ≤ i < j ≤ µ. For an individual ai ∈ N where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let ϕ(ai,S) denote the
vector 〈ϕ(ai, aλ(1)), ϕ(ai, aλ(2)), . . . , ϕ(ai, aλ(µ))〉.
The ILP formulation for the instance is as follows. For every µ-dimensional 1-0
vector β, letNβ = {ai ∈ N \T | ϕ(ai,S) = β} and nβ = |Nβ |. We create a variable
xβ for every µ-dimensional 1-0 vector β. Thus, there are in total 2
µ variables. Each
variable xβ indicates how many individuals from Nβ are included in the solution
U . These variables are subject to the following restrictions. Let V be the set of all
µ-dimensional 1-0 vectors.
(1) Since for every µ-dimensional 1-0 vector β there are at most nβ individuals
ai ∈ N \ T such that ϕ(ai,S) = β, we need to ensure that no more than nβ of these
individuals are in U . Moreover, every variable should be non-negative. Thus, every
variable xβ is subject to
0 ≤ xβ ≤ nβ.
(2) Since we can add at most k individuals in total, it has to be that
∑
β∈V
xβ ≤ k.
(3) In order to make every individual in S socially qualified, it has to be that
(3.1) for every aλ(i) ∈ S such that ϕ(aλ(i), aλ(i)) = 1
∑
aj∈T
ϕ(aj , aλ(i)) +
∑
β∈B
(β[i] · xβ) ≥ s; and
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(3.2) for every aλ(i) ∈ S such that ϕ(aλ(i), aλ(i)) = 0
∑
aj∈T
(1− ϕ(aj , aλ(i))) +
∑
β∈B
((1− β[i]) · xβ) ≤ t− 1,
where β[i] is the i-th component of β. The inequality (3.1) is to ensure that for every
aλ(i) ∈ S who qualifies herself there are at least s individuals in the final profile who
qualify aλ(i), and the inequality (3.2) is to ensure that for every individual aλ(i) ∈ S
who disqualifies herself there are at most t − 1 individuals in the final profile who
disqualify aλ(i).
Now let’s consider the GCDI problem. Let (f (s,t), N, ϕ, S, k) be a given instance
of the GCDI problem. The ILP formulation for the instance is similar to the one for
the GCAI problem discussed above. Let (a1, a2, . . . , an), {aλ(1), aλ(2), . . . , aλ(µ)},
ϕ(ai,S), andV be defined with the same meanings as above. For every µ-dimensional
1-0 vector β, let Nβ = {aj ∈ N \ S | ϕ(aj ,S) = β} and nβ = |Nβ |. We create a
variable yβ for every β ∈ V. Each variable yβ indicates how many individuals from
Nβ are deleted. The restrictions are as follows.
(1) For every β ∈ V we can delete at most nβ individuals inNβ . Moreover, each
variable should be non-negative. Thus, for every variable yβ , we have that
0 ≤ yβ ≤ n¯β .
(2) Since we can delete at most k individuals in total, we have that
∑
β∈V
yβ ≤ k.
(3) In order to make every individual in S socially qualified, it has to be that
(3.1) for every aλ(i) ∈ S such that ϕ(aλ(i), aλ(i)) = 1
∑
aj∈N
ϕ(aj , aλ(i))−
∑
β∈V
(β[i] · yβ) ≥ s; and
(3.2) for every aλ(i) ∈ S such that ϕ(aλ(i), aλ(i)) = 0
∑
aj∈N
(1 − ϕ(aj , aλ(i)))−
∑
β∈V
((1− β[i]) · yβ) ≤ t− 1.
According to Lemma 1, both ILPs shown above are solvable in timeO(v2.5v+o(v)·
poly(v · n)), where v = 2µ. As a result, both the GCAI and GCDI problems are FPT
with respect to µ = |S|. ⊓⊔
Consider now the GCPI problem for consent rules. In contrast to the fixed-parameter
tractability of the GCAI and GCDI problems, we show that the GCPI problem is un-
likely to admit an FPT-algorithm. In particular, we prove that the GCPI problem for
consent rules f (s,2) with s ≥ 3 remains NP-hard even when S is a singleton. This
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directly implies that the GCPI problem for consent rules is not FPT 2. Our reduction
is from the LRBDS problem which is NP-hard as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The LRBDS problem is NP-hard.
The proof for the above lemma is deferred to the Appendix.
Theorem 10 The GCPI problem is NP-hard for consent rules f (s,2) with s ≥ 3, even
when |S| = 1.
Proof We prove the theorem by a reduction from the LRBDS problem. Let I =
(G = (R ⊎ B,E), {1, 2, . . . , k}) be an instance of the LRBDS problem. Let s ≥ 3.
We create an instance EI = (N,ϕ, S) of GCPI for f (s,2) as follows. We create
k + s − 2 + |B| + |R| individuals in total. Let (R1, R2, . . . , Rk) be the partition
of R with respect to the labels of the vertices. That is, Ri where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is the
set of vertices in R with label i. For each vertex v ∈ Ri where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we
create an individual ai(v). Let Ai = {ai(v) | v ∈ Ri}. Moreover, for every vertex
u ∈ B, we create an individual a(u). Let A(B) = {a(u) | u ∈ B}. In addition,
we create a set C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck} of k individuals where each ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
corresponds to the label i. Moreover, we create an individual w and set S = {w}.
Finally, we create a set Adummy = {d1, d2, . . . , ds−3} of s− 3 dummy individuals.
Hence, N =
⋃
1≤i≤k Ai ∪ A(B) ∪ C ∪ Adummy ∪ S. The profile ϕ is defined as
follows.
1. ϕ(w,w) = 0;
2. ϕ(a(u), a(u′)) = 0 for every u, u′ ∈ B if and only if u = u′;
3. ϕ(ci, cj) = 1 for every ci, cj ∈ C if and only if i = j;
4. ϕ(x,w) = 0 for every x ∈ C ∪ A(B);
5. ϕ(ai(v), w) = 1 for every v ∈ Ri where 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
6. ϕ(ci, a(u)) = 1 for every ci ∈ C and a(u) ∈ A(B);
7. ϕ(a(u), ci) = 0 for every a(u) ∈ A(B) and ci ∈ C;
8. ϕ(di, di′) = 0 for every di, di′ ∈ Adummy;
9. ϕ(di, w) = 0 for every di ∈ Adummy;
10. ϕ(di, x) = 1 for every di ∈ Adummy and every x ∈ N \ (Adummy ∪ {w});
11. ϕ(x, di) = 0 for every di ∈ Adummy and every x ∈ N \ (Adummy ∪ {w});
12. ϕ(ai(v), a(u)) = 0 for every v ∈ Ri where 1 ≤ i ≤ k and every a(u) ∈ A(B) if
and only if (v, u) ∈ E;
13. ϕ(ai(v), cj) = 1 for every ai(v) ∈ Ri and cj ∈ C if and only if i = j; and
14. ϕ(x, y) which is not defined above can be set arbitrarily.
Now we show the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) LetW be a labeled red-blue dominating set of G. We shall show that EI is
a YES-instance.
Let U ⊆ N be the set consisting of the individual w and all individuals that
correspond to R \W . That is, U = S ∪ {ai(v) | v ∈ Ri \W, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Since
2 In fact, this implies that the GCPI problem for consent rules is even beyond XP, the class of all
parameterized problems which are solvable inO(|I|f(k)) time, where I is the main part, k is the parameter
and f is a computable function.
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ϕ(w,w) = 0, and every individual corresponding to some vertex in R qualifies w
(see 5), it holds that w ∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,U).
Now, let’s consider the profile restricted to N \ U . Observe that
(N \ U) ∩

 ⋃
1≤i≤k
Ai

 = {ai(v) | v ∈ Ri ∩W, 1 ≤ i ≤ k} .
Let a(u) be a candidate in A(B) with u ∈ B. According to the construction of ϕ and
the fact thatW dominatesB, there is at least one individual ai(v), corresponding to a
vertex v ∈W dominating u, who disqualifies a(u) (see 12). Since ϕ(a(u), a(u)) = 0
(see 2), it holds that a(u) 6∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \U). Since this holds for every a(u) ∈ A(B),
we have that A(B) ∩ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) = ∅. On the other hand, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
since |W ∩Ri| ≤ 1,N \U contains at most one individual ai(v) ∈ Ai. According to
the construction of ϕ, for every ci ∈ C only the following s− 1 individuals in N \U
qualify ci:
(1) ci herself;
(2) ai(v) ∈ Ai where v ∈W (see 13); and
(3) all s− 3 dummy individuals (see 10).
It directly follows that ci 6∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) for every ci ∈ C. Finally, since
ϕ(di, di′ ) = 0 for every di, di′ ∈ Adummy and all individuals inN \U disqualify all
dummy individuals, it holds that di 6∈ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) for every di ∈ Adummy. In
conclusion, (A(B)∪C ∪Adummy)∩ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \U) = ∅. Now, it is easy to verify
that ϕ(x,w) = 1 for every x ∈ (f (s,2)(ϕ,U)∪ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \U) \ {w}). As a result,
w ∈ f (s,2)(ϕ, f (s,2)(ϕ,U) ∪ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U)).
(⇐:) Let U ⊆ N such that w ∈ f (s,2)(ϕ, f (s,2)(ϕ,U) ∪ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U)). Due
to symmetry, assume that w ∈ U . Since ϕ(w,w) = 0, all the other individuals who
disqualify w must be in N \ U . That is, A(B) ∪ C ∪ Adummy ⊆ N \ U . Moreover,
all individuals in A(B) ∪C ∪Adummy must be eliminated in the profile restricted to
N \ U , i.e., (A(B) ∪C ∪ Adummy) ∩ f (s,2)(ϕ,N \ U) = ∅. Let a(u) be a vertex in
A(B)with u ∈ B. Sinceϕ(a(u), a(u)) = 0, to eliminate a(u), at least one individual
who disqualifies a(u) must be in N \ U . Due to the construction of the profile, all
individuals in N \ U who disqualify a(u), except a(u) herself, are in
⋃
1≤i≤k Ai.
Hence, at least one ai(v) ∈ Ai with v ∈ Ri who disqualifies a(u) must be in N \ U .
According to the construction, the vertex v dominates u in the graphG. This implies
thatW = {v ∈ R | ai(v) ∈ N \ U} dominates B. Now, we show thatW contains
at most one vertex in each Ri where 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let ci be an individual in C where
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Since ϕ(ci, ci) = 1, in order to eliminate each ci, at most s−1 individuals
who qualify ci can be in N \ U . According to the construction of the profile, all the
s − 3 dummy individuals in Adummy qualify ci. Moreover, all individuals in Ai
qualify ci. According to the above discussion, at most one of the individuals in Ai
can be in N \ U . Due to the definition of ϕ, this implies that |W ∩ Ri| ≤ 1. Now, it
is easy to see thatW is a solution of the instance I. ⊓⊔
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6 Conclusion
We have studied the complexity of the group control by adding individuals (GCAI),
group control by deleting individuals (GCDI), and group control by partitioning of in-
dividuals (GCPI) problems for the consent rules f (s,t), the consensus-start-respecting
rule fCSR, and the liberal-start-respecting rule fLSR, where in each problem an ex-
ternal agent has an incentive to make a given subset of individuals socially qualified
by adding, or deleting a limited number of individuals, or by partitioning the set of
individuals. In particular, as summarized in Table 1, we achieved dichotomy results
for all three group control problems for consent rules, with respect to the values of
the consent quotas. In addition, we studied the NP-hard problems from the parame-
terized complexity point of view, with respect to the size of S, the set of individuals
whom the external agent wants to make socially qualified. We proved that GCAI and
GCDI for consent rules are generally FPT. On the other hand, GCPI remains NP-hard
for some consent rules even when |S| = 1, excluding the possibility that the GCPI
problem for consent is FPT, unless the parameter hierarchy collapses at some level.
Table 1 shows that almost all social rules studied in this paper resist the three dif-
ferent control types, in the sense that either control problems for these rules are NP-
hard or these rules are immune to the corresponding control types. Only the GCDI
problem for consent rules f (s,2) and for fCSR are polynomial-time solvable. From
the parameterized complexity point of view, GCAI and GCDI for consent rules are
FPT while the procedural rule fLSR is immune to GCDI and GCPI. So, we can
conclude that the procedural rule fLSR outperforms the consent rules and fCSR in
terms of resistance to control behavior. Note that whether GCAI for the two procedu-
ral rules is FPT with respect to |S| remains open. Moreover, whether GCPI for fCSR
is NP-hard remains open.
Following the workshop version of this paper, there have been other papers which
look at similar problems. In particular, Erde´lyi, Reger, and Yang [13] extended our
study to destructive control and constructive/destructive bribery problems in group
identification. In addition, Erde´lyi, Reger, and Yang [14] also considered possibly
and necessarily socially qualified individuals problems in group identification. Ne-
vertheless, there still remain many directions for future research. For instance, for
consent rules, we assume that the consent quotas do not change. It would be quite
natural to consider group control problems where s and t depend on the number of
individuals, say, e.g., s is 30% percent and t is 35% of the number of individuals. In
addition, it is interesting to investigate the complexity of group control problems in
restricted domains of dichotomous preferences [12]. One can also study control and
bribery problems in generalized group identification [5] where the aim is to classify
the individuals into multiple groups instead of putting them into only two classes.
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Appendix
The appendix is devoted to the proof of Lemma 2. In particular, we prove the NP-
hardness of the LRBDS problem by a reduction from the RED-BLUE DOMINATING
SET problem which is NP-hard [20].
RED-BLUE DOMINATING SET (RBDS)
Input: A bipartite graphG = (R ⊎B,E) and an integer k.
Question: Is there a subsetW ⊆ R such that |W | ≤ k andW dominatesB?
Let I ′ = (G′ = (R′ ⊎ B′, E′), k) be an instance of the RBDS problem. We
construct an instance I = (G = (R ⊎ B,E), {1, 2, . . . , k}) for the LRBDS problem
as follows. For each vertex u ∈ B′, we create a vertex u¯ ∈ B. For each vertex
v ∈ R′, we create k vertices v(1), . . . , v(k) ∈ R, where the vertex v(i) is labeled
with i. Let Ri be the set of the vertices in R that have label i. The edges of the graph
G are defined as follows. If there is an edge {v, u} ∈ E′, then for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k
we create an edge between v(i) and u¯. This finishes the construction. It clearly takes
polynomial time.
Suppose that I ′ has a solutionW ′ of size k′ ≤ k. Let (vx(1), vx(2), . . . , vx(k′)) be
any arbitrary order of the vertices inW ′. LetW = {v(i) | vx(i) ∈ W
′, 1 ≤ i ≤ k′}.
It is clear that no two vertices in W have the same label, that is, |W ∩ Ri| ≤ 1 for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We shall show thatW dominates B. Let u be a vertex in B′. Since
W ′ dominates B′, there is a vertex vx(i) ∈ W
′ such that {vx(i), u} ∈ E
′. Then,
according to the construction of G, we know that {v(i), u¯} ∈ E. Since this holds for
every u ∈ B′,W dominates B.
Suppose that I has a solutionW . We assume that for every v ∈ R′, W contains
at most one of {v(1), v(2), . . . , v(k)}. Indeed if W contains two vertices v(i) and
v(j) where 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ k, then we could get a new solution W \ {v(j)} for
I , since according to the construction of the graph G, v(i) and v(j) have the same
neighborhood, implying that a vertex in B dominated by v(j) is dominated by v(i).
Let W ′ = {v ∈ R′ | v(i) ∈ W, 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Let u be a vertex in B′. SinceW is a
solution of I , there is a vertex v(i) ∈W which dominates u¯ ∈ B. Then, according to
the construction of the graph G, the vertex v ∈ W ′ dominates u. It follows thatW ′
dominatesB′.
